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I.

INTRODUCTION

Wartime procedures implemented by President Abraham Lincoln suggest much about politics and philosophy. When the government of a democratic nation imposes harsh methods to sustain
itself there rightly will be sincere protest and criticism, and there
will be slurs upon democracy itself. This criticism will ensure
whether or not the nation survives. Suppose, however, that it does
not survive. Suppose it fails because of internal division, dissension, or treason. In such cases, there will be greater criticism,
stressing the weakness and inadequacy alleged to be characteristic
of a democratic nation in an emergency.
In facing this situation, Lincoln was in a no-win position. He
would be condemned regardless of his actions. If he did not uphold
all of the provisions of the Constitution, he would be assailed not
only by those who genuinely valued civil liberty, but also by ene*
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mies and opponents whose motive was criticism itself. Far harsher
would have been his denunciation if the whole experiment of the
democratic American Union failed, as seemed possible given the
circumstances. If such a disaster occurred, what benefit would
have been gained by adhering to a fallen Constitution? It was a
classic example of the conflict: Do the ends justify the means?
Such, in part, was Lincoln's dilemma. To merely state the case
in this way does not, however, exhaust the subject. Suppression is
a matter of degree. To use a judicious amount of it does not imply
rampant brutality, severity, and despotism. Measures regarded as
severe in Lincoln's time would have seemed soft and "decadent" to
a Hitler or a Milosevich. Congress continued to sit, elections were
held, the Supreme Court functioned, lower courts sat and dissent
was allowed. It becomes, therefore, a matter of importance to examine the Lincoln procedures, to perceive them for what they
were, to study them against the backdrop of those threatening
times and to note the qualifications, concessions, compromises and
ameliorations that appeared in the human application of measures
that appear harsh, when considered in isolation.
To speak of the government as Lincoln's is in part true and in
part a matter of rhetoric. Abraham Lincoln was the nation's Attorney-in-Chief as well as the Commander-in-Chief. Much that happened was shaped by the force of the personality, discretion and
executive procedure of the President. Both the Congress and military leaders took actions which Lincoln disapproved.
In managing the government, Lincoln acted. He took authority; he was proactive; he did not depend upon Congress; he did not
take his cues from the courts; he made the presidency, to a large
extent, the dominant branch, certainly to a greater degree than it
had normally been. Professor Don E. Fehrenbacher, a noted Lincoln scholar, says that "Although Lincoln, in a general sense,
proved to be right, the history of the United States in the twentieth
century suggests that he brushed aside too lightly the problem of
the example that he might be setting for future presidents."'

1. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Paradoxes of Freedom, in Lincoln in Text and
Context: Collected Essays 129, 139 (1987).
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II.

DEMOCRATIC LEADER OR DICTATOR?

In the words of Professor James G. Randall, another preeminent Lincoln scholar, "No president has carried the power of presidential edict and executive order (independently of Congress) so
far as he did.... It would not be easy to state what Lincoln con2
ceived to be the limit of his powers."
It has been noted how, in the eighty days between the April
call for troops and the meeting of Congress on July 4, 1861, Lincoln
performed a whole series of important acts by sheer assumption of
presidential power. He proclaimed not a "civil war" in those words,
but the existence of "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." 3 He called forth the
militia to "suppress said combinations," 4 which he ordered "to disperse and retire peacefully" 5 to their homes. Congress is constitutionally empowered to declare war, but suppression of rebellion
has been recognized as an executive function, for which the prerogative of setting aside civil procedures has been placed in the President's hands. In this initial phase Lincoln also proclaimed a
blockade, suspended habeas corpus, increased the size of the regular army and authorized the expenditure of government money
without congressional appropriation. He made far reaching decisions and commitments while Congress was not in session, and all
without public polls. Lincoln could count, and he knew he had the
votes of both the people and the Congress. The verdict of history is
that Lincoln's use of power did not constitute abuse. Every survey
of historians ranks Lincoln as number one among the great
6
presidents.
2. J.G. Randall, The Rule of Law Under Lincoln, in Lincoln the Liberal
Statesman 118, 123 (1947).
3. Roy P. Basler et al., Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress, April 15, 1861, in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 331, 332 (1953)

[hereinafter Collected Works].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. For example, see Arther M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Ultimate Approval Rat-

ings, N.Y. Times Magazine, Dec. 15, 1996, at 46-51. Lincoln did well, too, in a
survey of famous people in the second millennium. He ranks 32nd behind
Gutenberg (1) and Hitler (20). See Agnes Hoope Gottlieb et al., 1,000 Years, 10,000
People: Ranking the Men and Women Who Shaped the Millennium (1998). CSPAN's Historians Survey of Presidential Leadership, prepared by fifty-eight re-

spondents and released on February 16, 2000, ranked Abraham Lincoln first.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, George Washington, Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Tru-
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By the time of his inauguration on March 4, 1861, seven southern states had already seceded from the Union. But Lincoln
played a waiting game, making no preparation for the use of force
until the sending of provisions to Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, a month later, precipitated its bombardment by the rebels.
The situation had become unstable.
Thus began Lincoln's period of executive decision. Congress
was not in session at the time (nor would it meet until the special
session of July 4, 1861), and it was basic to the Whig-Republican
theory of government, that Congress was vested with the ultimate
power-a theory with which Lincoln, as both Whig and Republican, had long agreed. As a former member of Congress, four-term
state legislator and, for twenty-four years a lawyer, Lincoln
respected traditional separation of powers. But now "events have
7
controlled me."

III.

SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS

The State of Maryland was seething with secessionist tendencies almost more violent at times than some states that did secede.
Events in Maryland ultimately provoked Lincoln's suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural method by which one who is imprisoned can file the writ in
an appropriate court to have his imprisonment reviewed. If the
imprisonment is found not to conform to law, the individual is entitled to immediate release. With suspension of the writ, this immediate judicial review of the imprisonment is unavailable. This
suspension triggered the most heated and serious constitutional
disputes over the Lincoln administration.
On April 19, 1861, the Sixth Massachusetts militia arrived in
Washington after having literally fought its way through Baltimore. On April 20, railroad communications with the North were
severed by Marylanders, almost isolating Washington D.C. from
that part of the nation for which it remained the capital. Lincoln
was apoplectic. He had no information about the whereabouts of
the other troops promised him by Northern governors, and Lincoln
man followed. See C-SPAN Survey of Presidential Leadership, Results (Feb. 8,

2000).
7.

4 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 344.
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told volunteers on April 24, "I don't believe there is any North. The
Seventh Regiment is a myth. Rhode Island is not known in our
geography any longer. You are the only Northern realities."s On
April 25, the Seventh New York militia finally reached Washington after struggling through Maryland. The right of habeas corpus
was so important, that the President considered the bombardment
of Maryland cities as preferable to its suspension. Lincoln authorized General Winfield Scott, Commander of the Army, in case of
"necessity," to bombard the cities, but only "in the extremist necessity"9 was Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
IV.

THE CASE OF JOHN MERRYMAN

In Maryland, there was at this time a dissatisfied American
named John Merryman. Merryman's dissent from the course being charted by Lincoln was expressed in both word and deed. He
spoke out vigorously in favor of the South, and recruited a company of soldiers for the Confederate Army. Merryman became
their Lieutenant Drillmaster. Thus, he not only exercised his Constitutional right to disagree with what the government was doing,
but he engaged in raising an armed group to attack and to attempt
to destroy the government. This young man's actions precipitated
legal conflict between the President and the Chief Justice of the
United States, Roger Taney. On May 25, 1861, Merryman was arrested by the military and lodged in Fort McHenry, Baltimore, for
various alleged acts of treason. Shortly after Merryman's arrest,
his counsel sought a writ of habeas corpus from Chief Justice Taney, alleging that Merryman was being illegally held at Fort McHenry. Taney, already infamous for Dred Scott,10 as a Circuit
Judge, took jurisdiction. On Sunday, May 26, 1861, Taney issued a
writ to Fort Commander George Cadwalader, directing him to produce Merryman before the Court the next day at 11:00 a.m. Cadwalader respectfully refused on the ground that President Lincoln
had authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. To Taney, this was blasphemy. He immediately issued an attachment
for Cadwalader for contempt. The marshal could not enter the
Fort to serve the attachment, however, so the old justice, recogniz8. Tyler Dennett, Lincoln and the Civil War, in The Diaries and Letters of
John Hay 1, 11 (1939).
9. 4 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 344.
10. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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ing the impossibility of enforcing his order, settled back and produced the now-famous opinion, Ex Parte Merryman."
Notwithstanding the fact that he was in his eighty-fifth year,
the Chief Justice vigorously defended the power of Congress alone
to suspend the right to the writ of habeas corpus. The Chief took
this position in part, because permissible suspension was in Article
I § 9 of the Constitution, the section describing Congressional duties. 12 He ignored the fact that it was placed there by the Committee on Drafting at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 as a
matter of form, not substance. Nowhere did he acknowledge that a
rebellion was in progress, and that the fate of the nation was, in
fact, at stake. Taney missed the crucial point made in the draft of
Lincoln's report to Congress on July 4:
[tihe whole of the laws which I was sworn to [execute] were
being resisted ... nearly one-third of the states. Must I have
allowed them to finally fail of execution?... Are all the laws
but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
13
pieces, lest that one be violated?
This was Lincoln, as both lawyer and politician, at his best.
By addressing Congress, Lincoln ignored Taney. Nothing more
was done about Merryman at the time. Merryman was thereafter
released from custody, and disappeared into oblivion. Congress,
two years later, resolved the ambiguity in the Constitution and
permitted the President the right to suspend the writ while the
14
rebellion continued.
Not least is the sense that we get, in a case like Merryman, of
what a clash between the executive and the judiciary is actually
like. This provides a healthy reminder of how much we usually
rely, in the last resort, on executive submission in upholding the
rule of law. Nevertheless, five years later (after the Union victory
and with a Lincoln appointee-Salmon P. Chase-as Chief Justice)
the Supreme Court reached essentially the same conclusion as Tall. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas. 144 (C.C.Md. 1861). Ex Parte for Merryman is reprinted in 1 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 578 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing & Office, 1880-1902).
12. U.S. Constitution, art. I., § 9.
13. 4 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 430.
14. See An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Relating Judicial Proceedings
in Certain Cases, ch. 812, 12 Stat. 755-58 (1863).
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ney in a case called Ex ParteMilligan.15 "The Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace.... The Government, within the Constitution, has all the
powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence." 16 Habeas corpus could be suspended, but only by Congress;
and even then, the majority said, civilians could not be held by the
Army for trial before a military tribunal, not even if the charge was
fomenting an armed uprising in a time of Civil War.
Lincoln never denied that he had stretched his Presidential
power. "These measures," he declared, "whether strictly legal or
not, were ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular necessity; trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify
them."' 7 Lincoln thus confronted Congress with a fait accompli. It
was a case of a President deliberately exercising legislative power,
and then seeking congressional ratification after the event. There
were those who adamantly believed that in doing so, he had exceeded his authority.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT SUSTAINS THE PRESIDENT IN THE

PRIZE CASES

The judiciary was allowed to speak to the constitutional issues. These constitutional questions-the validity of initial war
measures, the legal nature of the conflict, Lincoln's assumption of
war power-came before the Supreme Court in one of the classic
cases ever heard by that tribunal. The decision in the Prize
Cases'8 arose in March of 1863, though the specific executive acts
had been performed in 1861. The particular question before the
Court pertained to the seizure of vessels for violating the blockade
whose legality had been challenged since it was set up by presidential proclamation in absence of a congressional declaration of war.
The issue, however, had much broader implication, since the blockade was only one of the emergency measures Lincoln took by his
own authority in the "eighty days."
It was argued in the Prize Cases that Congress alone had
power to declare war, that the President had no right to institute a
blockade until after such a declaration, that war did not lawfully
15. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
16. Id.
17. 4 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 429.
18. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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exist when the seizures were made and that judgments against the
ships in lower federal courts were invalid. Had the high court in
1863 decided according to such arguments, it would have been declaring invalid the basic governmental acts by which the war was
waged in its early months, as well as the whole legal procedure by
which the government in Washington had met the 1861 emergency. The matter went even further, and some believed a decision
adverse to the President's excessive power would have overthrown,
or cast into doubt, the legality of the whole war.
Pondering such an embarrassment to the Lincoln administration, the distinguished lawyer Richard Henry Dana, Jr. wrote to
Charles Francis Adams: "Contemplate, the possibility of a
Supreme Court deciding that this blockade is illegal! ... It would
end the war, and how it would leave us with neutral powers, it is
fearful to contemplate!"19
Given these circumstances, it was a great relief to Lincoln and
his administration when the Court sustained the acts of the President, including the blockade. A Civil War, the Court held, does not
legally originate because it is declared by Congress. 20 Rather, it
simply occurs. The "party in rebellion" breaks its allegiance, "organized armies, and commences hostilities." 2 1 In such a case it is
the duty of the President to resist force by force, to meet the war as
he finds it "without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a
name." As to the weighty question whether the struggle was an
"insurrection," or a "war" in the full sense (as if between independ22
ent nations), the Court decided that it was both.
Lincoln's acts were thus held valid, the blockade upheld, and
23
the condemnation of the ships sustained, all by a narrow victory.
The decision, handed down on March 10, 1863, was five to four,
and Chief Justice Taney was among the dissenters. Again, Lincoln
was not Don Quixote-he would count popular, congressional, and
judicial votes. He had stacked the Court in his favor. His appoint24
ments were decisive in their votes.
19.
20.

James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln 52 (1951).
See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 649.

21. Id. at 666.
22.

Randall, supra note 19, at 71-72.

23. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 649.
24. Justice Robert C. Grier delivered the majority opinion. Three Lincoln appointees joined him-Noah H. Swayne, Samual F. Miller and David Davis. Loyal
Justice James M. Wayne of Georgia agreed with the majority.
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EMANCIPATION AS A MILITARY MEASURE

Another illustration of Lincoln's legal and political astuteness
relates to emancipation. The problem was prodigious. Nothing in
the Constitution authorized the Congress or the President to confiscate property without compensation. When the preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation, issued on September 22, 1862, declared slaves in the states, still in rebellion, to be free on January
1, 1863, the legal basis for this action seemed obscure. Lincoln
cited two acts of Congress for justification. 25 Although reference to
the two acts occupied much of the Proclamation, they actually had
little to do with the subject, indicating that Lincoln had not really
settled in his own mind the extent of his power, and on what authority to issue the Proclamation. But, by the time of the final
Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, Lincoln had concluded his act to be a war measure taken by the Commander-inChief to weaken the enemy.
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United
States by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-inChief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in time of
actual armed rebellion against the authority and government
of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure
for suppressing said rebellion, do... Order and declare that
all persons held as slaves within said designated States and
parts of States are, and henceforward shall be free .... 26
It may have had all "the moral grandeur of a bill of lading," as
Professor Richard Hofstader stated, 2 7 but the basic legal argument
for the validity of his action could be understood by everyone. And,
the time was ripe. To a hypothetical critic he wrote:
You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps
would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I
think differently. I think the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of war. The most that can be
said-if so much-is that slaves are property. Is there, or has
there ever been any question that by the law of war, property,
both of friends and enemies, may be taken when needed?
25.

See An Act to Make an Additional Article of War, March 13, 1862, and An

Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, July 17, 1862. 5 Collected
Works, supra note 3, at 434-35.
26. 4 Id. at 29-30.
27. Richard Hofstader, The American Political Tradition 169 (1974).
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And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us, or hurts the
28

enemy?

This is the Lincoln that consistently took the shortest distance between two legal points. The proposition as a matter of law may be
argued. But it is not the law being analyzed, but rather Lincoln's
political and legal approach to it. Lincoln saw the problem with
the same directness with which he dissected most problems: the
Commander-in-Chief may, under military necessity, take property.
Slaves were property. There was a military necessity. Therefore,
Lincoln, as Commander-in-Chief, took the property. Not only
could Lincoln count votes, he could reason clearly even during
crisis.
VII.

VALLANDIGHAM AND THE CORNING LETTER

29
Clement Laird Vallandigham, the number one Copperhead
of the Civil War, was perhaps President Lincoln's sharpest critic.
An Ohioan, this "wily agitator"3 0 found many substantial supporters for his views in New York State. Active in politics throughout
most of his life, he was elected to Congress from Ohio in 1856, 1858
and 1860. Before he was defeated for the 38th Congress in 1862,
he returned to Ohio to seek the Democratic nomination for Governor. In Congress he made a bitter political speech on July 10,
1861, criticizing Lincoln's inaugural address and the President's
message on the National Loan Bill. He charged the President with
the "wicked and hazardous experiment" of calling the people to
arms without counsel and authority of Congress; with violating the
Constitution in declaring a blockade of Southern ports; with "contemptuously" setting at defiance the Constitution in suspending
the writ of habeas corpus; and with "cooly" coming before the Congress and pleading that he was only "preserving and protecting"

28.

4 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 29-30.

29. Copperhead, a reproachful epithet, was used to denote Northerners who
sided with the South in the Civil War and were therefore deemed traitors, particularly those so-named Peace Democrats who assailed the Lincoln administration. It
was borrowed from the poisonous snake of the same name that lays in hiding and
strikes without warning. However, "Copperheads" regarded themselves as lovers
of liberty, and some of them wore as a lapel pin the head of the Goddess of Liberty
cut out of the large copper penny minted by the Federal treasury.
30. 6 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 266 (Letter to Erastus Coming and
others).
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the Constitution and demanding and expecting the thanks of Congress and the country for his "usurpations of power." 3 1
In his last extended speech in Congress, on January 14, 1863,
Vallandigham reviewed his lifelong attitude on slavery and espoused the extreme Copperhead doctrine when he said:
[nleither, sir, can you abolish slavery by argument....

The

South is resolved to maintain it at every hazard and by every
sacrifice; and if "this Union cannot endure 'part slave and
part free,' then it is already and finally dissolved.... But I
deny the doctrine. It is full of disunion and civil war. It is
disunion itself. Whoever first taught it ought to be dealt with
not only as hostile to the Union, but as an enemy of the
human race. Sir, the fundamental idea of the Constitution is
the perfect and eternal compatibility of a union of States 'part
slave and part free'. ...

In my deliberate judgment, a confed-

eracy made up of a slave-holding and non-slave-holding
States is, in the nature of things, the strongest of all popular
32
governments.
Later that year, on March 25, 1863, General Ambrose B. Burnside took command of the Department of the Ohio with headquarters at Cincinnati. Burnside, who had succeeded McClellan in the
command of the Army of the Potomac, had failed miserably before
General Robert E. Lee at Fredericksburg. He was smarting from
failure, and anxious to repair his military reputation. The seat of
the Copperhead movement was in this area. Wholesale criticism of
the war was rampant. It was particularly offensive to Burnside at
this time. On March 21, the week after Vallandigham's return
from Washington, and four days before Burnside took command of
the Department of the Ohio, Vallandigham made one of his typical
speeches at Hamilton, Ohio. On April 13, General Burnside, without consultation with his superiors, issued his famous General Order No. 38, in which he announced that all persons found within
the Union lines committing acts for the benefit of the enemies of
the country would be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted,
would suffer death. 33 The Order enumerated the various classes of
persons falling within its scope, announced that the habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy would not be allowed in the De31. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., 23, 100, 348 (1861). See Frank L. Mement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War (1998).
32. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix, 52-60 (1862).
33. See Klement, supra note 31, at 149.
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partment and that persons committing such offenses would be at
once arrested with a view to being tried or banished from the
Union lines.
Learning that Vallandigham was to speak at a Democratic
mass meeting at Mt. Vernon, Ohio, on May 1, 1863, Burnside dispatched two captains in civilian clothes from his staff to listen to
Vallandigham's speech. One of the captains leaned against the
speaker's platform and took notes. The other stood a few feet from
the platform in the audience. As a result of their reports, Vallandigham was arrested in his home at Dayton, on Burnside's orders, early after midnight on May 5 and escorted to the military
prison, Kemper Barracks, at Cincinnati. On May 6 and 7, he was
tried by a military commission convened by General Burnside,
found guilty of violation of General Order No. 38 and sentenced to
34
imprisonment for the duration of the war.

On the first day of his imprisonment, Vallandigham smuggled
out a message "To the Democracy of Ohio," in which he protested
that his arrest was illegal and for no other offense than an expression of his "political opinion." He urged his fellow Democrats to
"stand firm" and assured them, "As for myself, I adhere to every
principle, and will make good through imprisonment and life itself,
every pledge and declaration which I have ever made, uttered or
maintained from the beginning."3 5 Vallandigham's counsel applied to the United States Circuit Court, sitting at Cincinnati, for a
writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. This time, unlike in Merryman, the Court agreed with the suspension. An application was
made later for a writ of certiorarito bring the proceedings of the
military commission for review before the Supreme Court of the
United States. This application was denied on the ground that the
6
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over a military tribunal.3
General Burnside approved the finding and the sentence of the
military commission, and made plans to send Vallandigham to
Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, for imprisonment. Before these
plans could be carried out, President Lincoln telegraphed an order
that commuted the sentence to banishment from Union lines.3 7
34. See id. at 152-68.
35. Id. at 163-64.
36. See id. at 171. The Supreme Court would exercise such jurisdiction after
the war in Ex Parte Milligan.
37. See id. at 177-78.
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In conformity with the President's order, Vallandigham was
conducted by way of Louisville, Kentucky, and Murfreesboro, Tennessee, to the Confederate lines. He reached the headquarters of
General Braxton Bragg May 25, 1863. Upon reaching the Confederate outpost and before the Federal officers left him, Vallandigham stated: "I am a citizen of Ohio, and of the United
States. I am here within your lines by force, and against my will. I
therefore surrender myself to you as a prisoner of war."3 8 Vallandigham found his way to Richmond, where he was received indifferently by the Confederate authorities, and the fiction that he
was a prisoner of war was maintained. Having resolved before
leaving Cincinnati to endeavor to go to Canada, Vallandigham,
without interference, took passage on June 17, 1863, on the blockade runner Cornubia bound for Bermuda from Wilmington, arriving on June 20, 1863. After ten days in Bermuda he went by
steamer to Halifax, arriving on July 5, 1863. He then found his
way to Niagara Falls, Canada. He settled at Windsor, opposite Detroit, where he remained until he returned to Ohio on June 15,
1864.
The arrest, military trial, conviction and sentence of Vallandigham aroused excitement throughout the country. Criticism
of Burnside for the issuance of General Order No. 38, and for using
it against Vallandigham was widespread. President Lincoln was
also severely criticized for not countermanding the sentence instead of commuting it. The general dissatisfaction with the case
was not confined to the radical Copperheads. Many conservative
Democrats, loyal supporters of the Government in the prosecution
of the war, were disturbed. Many Republican newspapers joined in
questioning the action. Public meetings of protest were held in
many cities.
One of the most dignified and impressive protest meetings was
held by the Democrats of Albany, New York, on Saturday evening,
May 16, 1863, three days before Lincoln altered Burnside's sentence of imprisonment, and ordered that Vallandigham be sent beyond federal lines. Held in front of the Capital in the park, it was
presided over by the Honorable Erastus Coming, a distinguished
congressman from Albany. The meeting was endorsed by Gover-

38. Id. at 181-83.
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nor Horatio Seymour who, unable to attend, sent a letter which
said:
The action of the Administration will determine in the minds
of more than one half of the people of the loyal States whether
this war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or to
destroy free institutions at the North. We look for its decision
39
with the most solemn solicitude.
Fiery speeches criticized Burnside for his action against Vallandigham, and pent-up feeling was expressed against the alleged
arbitrary action of the Administration in suppressing the liberty of
speech and of the press, the right of trial by jury, the law of evidence and the right of habeas corpus, and, in general, the assertion
of the supremacy of military over civil law. A series of resolutions
was adopted by acclamation, and it was ordered that a copy of
these resolutions be transmitted "to his Excellency the President of
the United States, with the assurance of this meeting of their
hearty and earnest desire to support the Government in every Constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the existing Rebellion."40 Bearing the date of May 19, 1863, the resolutions were
addressed to the President along with a brief note signed by Erastus Coming as president of the assemblage, as well as by the vicepresidents and secretaries. The resolutions were couched in dignified and respectful language, but the clear implication was that
those attending the meeting regarded the arrest and imprisonment
of Vallandigham illegal and unconstitutional, and that they de41
plored the usurpation of personal rights by the Administration.
On May 28, 1863, the President acknowledged receipt of the resolutions in a note addressed to "Hon. Erastus Coming," and promised to "give the resolutions consideration" and to try "to find time
42
and make a respectful response."
There is no record that Lincoln was consulted by General
Burnside in advance of the issuance of General Order No. 38, nor
upon the arrest, trial and sentence of Vallandigham. Lincoln was,
of course, thoroughly familiar with Vallandigham as leader of the
Copperheads, and with the criticisms of his own administration. If
39. Id. at 180-81.
40.

The Albany Resolves are in Edward McPherson, The Political History of

the United States of America: During the Great Rebellion 163 (1864).
41. See Klement, supra 31, at 182.
42. 6 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 235.
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left to Lincoln, he doubtless would have counseled that Vallandigham be allowed to talk himself to death politically.
On June 12, 1863, the President sent his studied reply to the
Albany Democrats, addressed to "Hon. Erastus Coming & others."
In a closely reasoned document of more than 3,000 words, and in
lawyer-like fashion, Lincoln justified the action of the Administration in the arrest, trial, imprisonment and banishment of Vallandigham, and elaborated his view that certain proceedings are
constitutional "when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
Safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in
absence of rebellion or invasion, the public Safety does not require
them." 43 The President defended the action not on free speech
44
grounds but on the effects of such speech.
The political instincts of the lawyer-President emerged in Lincoln's reply, when he said:
In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which
you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting
speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with full respect for their
known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation
with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to
suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any other way
than that they preferred to designate themselves 'democrats'
rather than 'American citizens.' In this time of national peril,
I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step
45
higher than any party platform.
Erastus Coming referred Lincoln's response to the committee
that reported the resolutions. Under date of July 3, 1863, Mr.
Coming forwarded to the President the rejoinder of the committee,
a document of more than 3,000 words. This rejoinder dwelt at
length upon what it deemed "repeated and continued" invasions of
constitutional liberty and private right by the Administration, and
asked anew what the justification was "for the monstrous proceeding in the case of a citizen of Ohio."46 The rejoinder, drawn mainly
by an ex-justice of the State Court of Appeals, John V.L. Pruyn, did
43. Id. at 264.
44. See id. at 260-72.
45. Id. at 267.
46. John V.L. Pruyn et al., Reply to President Lincoln's Letter of 12th of June
1863, Papers from the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge, no.10
(1863). The pamphlet is in Frank Freidel, Union Pamphlets of the Civil War,
1861-1865, at 760 (1967) (page references are to that reprint).
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not maintain the even dignity of the original resolutions, charged
Lincoln with "pretensions to more than regal authority"47 and insisted that he had used "misty and cloudy forms of expression" in
setting forth his pretensions. 48 The committee was especially sensitive of Lincoln's remark that the resolutions were presented by
"Democrats," instead of by "American citizens,"49 and sought to
turn the tables on the President. Lincoln was too busy with a thousand other issues to engage in prolonged debates. As was his wont,
he had his say in his reply to the initial resolutions, ignored this
50
rebuttal and turned to other matters.
Almost simultaneously, Lincoln was engaged in a similar encounter with Democrats in Ohio. The Ohio Democratic State Convention held at Columbus on June 11, 1863, while Vallandigham
was still within the Confederate lines, nominated him for Governor
by acclamation. George B. Pugh, Vallandigham's lawyer in the
habeas corpus proceedings, was nominated for Lieutenant Governor. The convention passed a series of resolutions condemning the
arrest, trial, imprisonment and banishment of Vallandigham and
appointed a committee of 19 members to communicate with the
President and to request the return of Vallandigham to Ohio.
The committee, all members of Congress, addressed their communication from Washington on June 26, 1863, "To His Excellency
the President of the United States."5 1 The committee called on the
President at the White House and filed with him its protest, including the detailed resolutions adopted by the Ohio Democratic
State Convention. The resolutions were similar in import to those
adopted by the Albany Democrats, and held that "the arrest, imprisonment, pretended trial and actual banishment of Clement L.
52
Vallandigham" was a "palpable" violation of the Constitution.
The committee went on to elaborate its view that the Constitution
is not different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in
53
time of peace and public security.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
(1872).
52.
53.

Id. at 755.
Id.
See id. at 763.
Klement, supra note 31, at 183.
James Laird Vallandigham, A Life of Clement L. Vallandigham
Id. at 304.
See id. at 305-11.
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Employing the arguments used in his letter to the Albany
Democrats, and not departing from the principles there expressed,
Lincoln very promptly replied to the Ohio committee. He added "a
word" to his Albany response:
You claim that men may, if they choose, embarrass those
whose duty it is to combat a giant rebellion, and then be dealt
with in turn, only as if there was no rebellion. The constitution itself rejects this view. The military arrests and detentions, which have been made, including those of Mr. V. which
are not different in principle from the others, have been for
prevention and not for punishment-asinjunctions to stay in54
jury, as proceedings to keep the peace.
In concluding his reply, Lincoln introduced a new and lawyerlike proposal. He insisted that the attitude of the committee encouraged desertion and resistance to the draft, and promised to release Vallandigham if a majority of the committee would sign and
return to him a duplicate of his letter committing themselves to
the following propositions:
1) That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the national Union;
and that in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional
means for suppressing the rebellion.
2) That no one of you will do anything which in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease,
or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy, while engaged in
the effort to suppress that rebellion; and,
3) That each of you will, in his own sphere, do all he can to
have the officers, soldiers and seamen of the army and navy,
while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid,
fed, clad, and otherwise well provided and supported. 55
The Ohio committee was prompt in their rejoinder to Lincoln,
dating their immediate response in a letter from New York City on
July 1, 1863. The committee spurned Lincoln's concluding proposals and asked for the revocation of the order of banishment, not as
a favor, but as a right, without sacrifice of their dignity and selfrespect. Lincoln did not reply to the rejoinder of the Ohio
committee.
54.

6 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 304.

55. Id. at 305.
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Safe in his retreat in Canada, Vallandigham accepted the
nomination for Governor of Ohio by the Democratic State Convention, in an impassioned address by letter "To the Democrats of
Ohio." The name of Burnside was "infamous forever in the ears of
all lovers of constitutional liberty," and the President was guilty of
"outrages upon liberty and the Constitution." 56 Vallandigham's
"opinions and convictions as to war," and his faith "as to final results from sound policy and wise statesmanship," were not only
"unchanged but confirmed and strengthened." 5 7
The Democrats of Ohio carried on a vigorous campaign for the
Governorship. The Republicans nominated a former Democrat,
John Brough, for Governor. The keynote of the campaign was expressed by the Republican State Convention in the declaration and
proposal that "in the present exigencies of the Republic we lay
aside personal preferences and prejudices, and henceforth, till the
war is ended, will draw no party line but the great line between
those who sustain the government and those who rejoice in the triumph of the enemy."
The tone and temper of the Democratic campaign was typically illustrated in an address by George E. Pugh, candidate for
Lieutenant Governor, at St. Mary's, Ohio, on August 15, 1863.
THE CRISIS (Columbus, Ohio) for September 16 published
the address in full. Pugh paid his compliments to Lincoln in language which outdid Vallandigham:
Beyond the limits and powers confided to him by the Constitution, he is a mere County court lawyer, and not entitled to
any obedience or respect, so help me God [Cheers and cries of
'Good'.] And when he attempts to compel obedience beyond
the limits of the Constitution by bayonets and by swords, I
say that he is a base and despotic usurper, whom it is your
duty to restrict by every possible means if necessary, by force
of arms. [Cheers and cries That's the talk'.] If I must have a
despot, if I must be subject to the will of any one man, for
God's sake let him be a man who possesses some great civil or
military virtues. Give me a man eminent in council, or eminent in the field, but for God's sake don't give me the miserable mountebank who at present exercises the office of
President of the United States. 58
56.
57.
58.

Vallandigham, supra note 51, at 320.
Id. at 321.
Klement, supra note 31, at 248.
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This extreme language, inspired originally by Vallandigham,
no doubt contributed to the result of the election. The total vote in
Ohio was more than 476,000. Brough received a majority of 61,752
at home and 40,000 in the armed forces. The Republicans won 29
of the 34 seats in the State Senate and 73 of the 97 in the House. 5 9
One more formal effort was made in Vallandigham's behalf.
On February 29, 1864, Congressman George H. Pendleton from
Ohio offered the following resolution in the House of Representatives and moved the previous question for adoption:
Resolved... That the military arrest, without civil warrant,
and trial by military commission, without jury, of Clement L.
Vallandigham, a citizen of Ohio, not in the land or naval
forces of the United States, or the militia in active service, by
order of Major General Burnside, and his subsequent banishment by order of the President, executed by military force,
were acts of mere arbitrary power, in palpable violation of the
60
Constitution and laws of the United States.
The proposed resolution was killed by a vote of 37 to 35.61
VIII.

VALLANDIGHAM AND

NEW YORK

Vallandigham had visited New York State not long before his
arrest in Ohio, and again shortly after returning from Canada. On
each occasion he addressed large sympathetic crowds. In March,
1863, before he celebrated his arrest, he had spoken to the Democratic Union Association in New York City, receiving "loud and
protracted cheers."6 2 He then proceeded to Albany to confer "with
leading men of the party on the state of the country."6 3 A few
weeks later he was arrested at his home in Dayton, Ohio, on General Burnside's orders.
Ending his exile in mid-June, 1864, Vallandigham was soon
back on the oratorical platform. The first meeting he addressed
outside Ohio was at Syracuse on July 18-"the number in attendance estimated at seventy-five thousand," an improbable estimate
as the Syracuse census of 1865 showed a population of 32,000.
59. See id. at 252.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 879 (1864).
See id.
Vallandigham, supra note 51, at 236.
Id. at 237.
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IX.

THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY

The crux of Lincoln's policy was his support of the doctrine of
necessity. In his view, the civil courts were powerless to deal with
the insurrectionary activities of individuals, saying:
he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one
soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he
who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion, or inducement, may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of
64
which any civil court would take cognizance.
He knew that as president he had to act.
In his most famous passage on the subject, contained in the
Coming Letter, Lincoln stated eloquently:
Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I
must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert? This is nonetheless injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend in a public meeting, and
there working upon his feelings until he is persuaded to write
the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked
administration of a contemptible government, too weak to
arrest and punish him if he so deserts. I think that, in such a
case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only con65
stitutional, but withal a great mercy.
X.

CONCLUSION

What made Lincoln a successful Commander-in-Chief was his
constitutional flexibility, that allowed him to bend the text within
the framework of his wise, honest, restrained, temperament without breaking it. Lincoln the lawyer-President avoided narrow
overemphasis, and understood the difference between distortion
for personal aggrandizement and clarification for a higher purpose-that of preserving the greatest legal framework ever devised: the Constitution. Lincoln alternately preached to the
American people and ordered arms to fulfill the true destiny of the
Union as "the last best hope of earth." 66 He could not have done
this if he had not been first a lawyer, and then a president. Rather
than limit himself to the role of Commander-in-Chief or Attorneyin-Chief, he used his background to deliver the greatest perform64.
65.
66.

4 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 264.
Id. at 266.
6 Collected Works, supra note 3, at 537.
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ance of his life in the courtroom of world opinion. In the "Epilogue"
to his Fate of Liberty, Mark E. Neely, Jr., closes by saying:
If a situation were to arise again in the United States when
the writ of habeascorpus were suspended, government would
probably be as ill-prepared to define the legal situation as it
was in 1861. The clearest lesson is that there is no clear lesson in the Civil War-no neat precedents, no ground rules, no
map. War and its effect on civil liberties remain a frightening
67
unknown.
President Lincoln both knew, and understood this to be true.

67. Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties 235 (1991).

